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ABSTRACT
The introduction of the IPv6 protocol solved the problem of provid-
ing addresses to network devices. With the emergence of the Inter-
net of Things (IoT), there was also the need to develop a protocol
that would assist in connecting low-power devices. The 6LoWPAN
protocols were created for this purpose. However, such protocols
inherited the vulnerabilities and threats related to Denial of Service
(DoS) attacks from the IPv4 and IPv6 protocols. In this paper, we
prepare a network environment for low-power IoT devices using
COOJA simulator and Contiki operating system to analyze the
energy consumption of devices. Besides, we propose an Intrusion
Detection System (IDS) associated with the AES symmetric en-
cryption algorithm for the detection of reflection DoS attacks. The
symmetric encryption has proven to be an appropriate method
due to low implementation overhead, not incurring in large power
consumption, and keeping a high level of system security. The main
contributions of this paper are: (i) implementation of a reflection
attack algorithm for IoT devices; (ii) implementation of an intru-
sion detection system using AES encryption; (iii) comparison of
the power consumption in three distinct scenarios: normal mes-
sage exchange, the occurrence of a reflection attack, and running
IDS algorithm. Finally, the results presented show that the IDS
with symmetric cryptography meets the security requirements and
respects the energy limits of low-power sensors.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In the last decade laptops and servers have been the biggest targets
of hacker attacks. However, lately there has been a growing increase
in attacks targeted at subsystems of connected homes, such as light-
ing, thermostats, intelligent locks, etc. The Internet of Things (IoT)
has been responsible for a 60 % increase in the number of attacks
[1]. The increase was not only in volume but also in frequency
and complexity. One of the common attacks is the reflection attack.
Especially in low-power IoT systems, such attacks are more difficult
to deal with due to scarce resources such as computing power and
low bandwidth. The challenge of preventing an attack by reflection
is due to its ability to create very large attacks [2].
The reflection-based attack creates an amplification of traffic, in
which the source IP address is replaced by the IP address of the
attacked host and these requests are sent to servers or other devices
that can be used to reflect network traffic, making responses to
these requests sent to the destination node. The victim will end
up receiving a large volume of response packets that it never had
requested. The traffic reflection mechanism increases complexity
to identify the real source of the attack [3].
The problem is how to ensure the security of IoT devices, how to
keep the network informed that security has not been violated. This
work presents a C language-based Intrusion Detection System (IDS),
developed with the symmetric AES encryption algorithm, designed
to inhibit reflection attacks, to enable a secure environment for IoT
devices on a low-power network.
The AES algorithm is quite convenient for structuring an IDS
due to its excellent performance compared to other encryption
algorithms [4]. Furthermore, there is an excellent cost-benefit ra-
tio when using AES with lower power consumption to applying
encryption on low-power devices [5].
Several IoT devices can be highly secure. However, if only one
device connected to this network has some security vulnerability,
it could be exploited by an unauthorized attacker and the entire
network would be compromised. In this context, new protocols
are being developed to make connecting IoT devices more secure.
Moreover, this fact can be verified in the adaptation of IPv6 with
the 802.15.4 (WPAN - Wireless Personal Area Network) protocol
that was deployed in the 6LoWPAN (IPv6 over Low-Power Wireless
Personal Area Network) [6], which in addition to having low-power
consumption in wireless networks, can also be implemented in
embedded systems, enabling greater security for IoT devices.
In this work, an environment of IoT devices that communicate
on a 6LoWPAN network was simulated using the COOJA simulator.
The COOJA allows you to create a realistic scenario, that is, the
same scenario in which physical devices working on a network
during a real operation [7]. Devices are emulated using the concept
of virtual machines, and emulation lets you specify that nodes are
real machines running the real protocol, where each node has the
Contiki operating system running internally as if it were physically
installed [8]. Therefore, all code developed for the COOJA simulator
can be immediately deployed in a real environment. The results of
the simulations in terms of power consumption were compared be-
tween three distinct scenarios: while performing normal operations,
during the attack itself, and while the IDS is running.
Briefly, the contributions of this paper are three:
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• Address reflection attacks on low-power IoT devices using
the Contiki operating system;
• Present an IDS developed in C language based on symmetric
AES encryption designed to inhibit reflection attacks, tested
on a simulator based on real emulated IoT devices, COOJA;
• Comparison of energy consumption results obtained during
simulations and collected during execution in three distinct
scenarios: normal operation, during an attack, and running
IDS.
In the Section 2 wewill present the review of the recent literature,
the theoretical background and the adopted model of attacks in the
Section 3, the experimental environment used with results in the
Section 4, and finally the conclusions are in the Section 5.
2 LITERATURE REVIEW
Recent works in areas of IoT and Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN)
demonstrate the need to design specific IDS systems. In Kasinathan
et al. [9], the scenario proposed was the manufacturing environ-
ment where the DoS attack is directed at devices that control the
temperature and pressure of machines during production. The at-
tack is made through Jamming where it is directed to a 6LoWPAN
network, causing the company security officer to receive a notifica-
tion from the IDS system. The proposed DoS detection architecture
provides immunity to similar attacks protected by the IDS archi-
tecture, centralized processing running on Linux, overcoming the
constraints on IoT devices, and reducing false-positives that are
managed by IDS. However, the work adopts familiar IDS strategies
that were not designed for WSNs and are IP-based. Because DoS
attacks often render the wireless network channel unusable, the
intrusion detection systems studied fail to perform the most basic
operations they should perform.
Bouyeddou et al. [10], mentioned that ICMP (Internet Control
Message Protocol) flood attacks are still one of the most challenging
threats on IPv4 and IPv6 networks. It is noteworthy, therefore, that
the smurf attack uses this method widely. The authors proposed an
approach based on the Kullback-Leibler (KLD) to detect DoS flood
attacks based on ICMP andDDoS. This is motivated by the KLD high
capacity to discriminate quantitatively between two distributions.
The analysis was supported by the six-sigma rule that was applied to
KLD distances for anomaly detection by assessing the effectiveness
of data sets using the 1999 DARPA’s IDS [11].
In [12] an approach based on 6LowPAN neighbor discovery
protocol is proposed to mitigate DoS attacks initiated from the
Internet, without adding additional overhead on the 6LoWPAN sen-
sor devices. To combat hacking attacks, the authors used ICMPv6
messages with Address Registration Option (ARO) 1, which is used
in Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP) and modified in a 6LoWPAN
(6LoWPAN-ND) network. Duplicate Address Request (DAR) and
Duplicate Address Confirmation (DAC) messages were used, which
are two types of ICMPv6 messages defined to perform optional
duplicate address detection. In the 6LoWPAN-ND network, nodes
in a 6LoWPAN network use NDP to perform automatic address
configuration, network layer address resolution, neighbor unreach-
ability detection, and to locate default routers. However, the authors
1The Address Registration Option (ARO) is a type of ICMPv6 message option used by
the new neighbor discovery protocol (NDP or ND) [12].
saw deficiencies and limitations, as most mechanisms against se-
curity attacks require high computational resources, making them
unsuitable for use in smart object networks. Deficiencies arise for
two reasons: it is very easy to consume resources on low-power
networks, as sensor energy can be consumed quickly, making them
unavailable until the attack is over and the battery is recharged.
In Cervantes et al. the authors proposed the Thatachi intrusion
detection system, which is a system that seeks to detect and isolate
from the network attacking devices that exhibit any abnormal be-
havior. Using the COOJA simulator, a low false-positive rate was
noticed for low-power and low resource devices. Thatachi has been
effective in mitigating specific attacks on the IoT network routing
service. The author compares Thatachi’s false-positive metrics with
INTI, the latter being designed to mitigate sinkhole attacks. Overall
the metrics used showed a good Thatachi score in relation to INTI
within the sinkhole attack scenario. The limitation of Thatachi IDS
is to achieve a good result only in the type of sinkhole attack and
selective forwarding [13].
An implementation of a UDP flood attack was described in [14].
They used the Contiki operating system, and also implemented
and demonstrated the model in the COOJA simulator. The goal
was to propose a bandwidth throttling mechanism that should be
incorporated into the Contiki operating system to mitigate UDP
flood attacks. The proposed scheme reduced the victim’s energy
consumption by 9% and saved the victim’s total transmission power
by 55%. The authors also provided an overview of distributed DoS
type attacks trends targeting IoT protocols, such as IPv6, 6LoWPAN,
and RPL. They explain that DoS aims to consume resources from
a host or remote network by denying or degrading services to
legitimate users [14].
One of the searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) used in IoT
devices was proposed by DAO et al. [15] who presented a compact
and low energy consumption AES core, using a small S-box and
an improved key in an expansion block. The authors presented
two optimizations: the first was the optimization of the S-box;
the second was the optimization of the Rcon block. The S-box is
transformed from the GF(28) 2 architecture to the GF(28) / GF(24) /
GF(22) architecture and is then inverted. The Rcon block, therefore,
is optimized by the simple Boolean optimization method. Finally,
the authors concluded by stating that AES encryption is highly
potential for use in power restricted wireless network applications,
such as wireless sensor networks and IoT systems for monitoring
the environment that requires low-power consumption.
The construction of microcontroller architecture based on the
AES architecture presented by the authors ZHAO, et al. [5] had a
result which was the lower energy consumption by cryptography.
They studied variations in the architectures of the AES algorithm
and certify that the preferred choice for IoT devices is AES. In the
article, the authors still reinforce that it will be the choice adopted
as a reference for new explorations in the development of smart
devices [5].
2A finite field GF(2𝑚 ) is an algebraic set structure of 2𝑚 elements upon which various
arithmetic operations uses, including cryptography. Every GF(2𝑚 ) finite field contains
2𝑚 elements. Polynomials over GF(2) indicate that the coefficients have elements
between 0 and 1. As form the polynomial basis with m elements, every finite field
contains at least one irreducible polynomial over GF(2) associated [16].
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3 BACKGROUND AND THREAT MODEL
Embedded devices and smart devices are the elements that make the
Internet of Things a reality. Some examples of embedded devices
that can be cited are: health monitoring devices such as pacemakers,
home automation devices, industrial automation devices, intelligent
monitoring, and environment monitoring systems [17]. Technolo-
gies such as wireless sensors, remote sensing, embedded sensors in
agricultural machines, and traceability tools are currently facing
the biggest research challenges regarding safety [18].
Industry 4.0 refers to a recent concept that describes a productive
environment supported by industrial automation, including the
Internet of Things, big data, cloud computing, blockchain, and
machine learning algorithms. [19–22]. The emergence of Industry
4.0 has brought many technological and operational advantages
resulting in competitive opportunities, but with it, cybersecurity
challenges have made it one of the priority themes in this new
scenario [20].
3.1 IPv4 vs IPv6
IPv6 protocols allow 128-bit addresses to be made available, while
IPv4 only distributes 32-bit addresses. Thus, IPv4 supports about
4.29 billion IP addresses, and therefore this would explain the need
for the evolution to IPv6, as it is no longer possible to generate
addresses using the protocol technology currently provided by IPv4.
With the advent of IoT, the demand for new specific IP addresses
for each embedded device has increased significantly over the last
few years.
Focusing on the IPv6 protocol and the security issue the IP Secu-
rity Protocol (IPSec) is used, natively in the IPv6 protocol, encrypt-
ing the packets and operating at the OSI network layer level, while
SSL/TLS act at the middle layer, that is, between the application
and transport layer of the TCP/IP model. IPSec uses a variety of
encryption capabilities. It uses asymmetric keys to ensure the au-
thenticity and integrity of the parties involved, symmetric keys for
data confidentiality, and hash functions for data integrity. The im-
plementation of IPSec does not require any changes to applications
and operating systems and can be used in its standard configuration
[23].
An advantage of IPSec for IoT is the use of the authentication
header (AH), as it does not care about confidentiality, but guar-
antees the authenticity and integrity of the data. AH ensures the
authenticity and integrity of both the IP header and the data. One of
the advantages of using AH is the ability to use specific parameters
that make DoS or DDoS attacks weakly because they discard these
packet types that do not meet the requirements that are set by
specific parameters.
3.2 6LoWPAN
IPv6 over Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Network (6LoWPAN)
is an IETF working group responsible for creating and maintaining
specifications that allow you to use IPv6 in IEEE 802.15.4 networks.
To this end, packet compression and fragmentation are consid-
ered in data transmission, making information exchange between
low-power devices efficient. By manufacturing specification, such
devices are susceptible to packet loss, which would make it impos-
sible to use the IPv6 protocol. Therefore, the 6LoWPAN protocol
is a specification for transmitting data over the IPv6 standard in
wireless networks by low-power devices and limited processing
power. For this reason, 6LoWPAN is currently considered one of the
best specifications for IoT implementation. In addition to 6LowPAN,
two other examples of protocols that use the IEEE 802.15.4 physical
protocol stack are ZigBee and the Thread protocol. A comparison
between ZigBee and Thread is shown in Figure 1 [24]. IEEE 802.15.4
standardization enables interoperability between these protocols.
The IEEE 802.15.4 standard uses 5 MHz channels and can range
from 2.405 GHz to 2.480 GHz. The maximum data rate is around 250
kbps, ranging from a few meters to hundreds of meters of reach.
Figure 1: Network architecture for low-power devices [24]
3.3 ContikiOS and COOJA
ContikiOS is an operating system used on a wide range of IoT
devices and is open source. ContikiOS supports the IPv6, IPv4, and
6LoWPAN family protocols. Applications can be developed in C and
through ContikiOS it is possible to use COOJA, a real environment
network simulator of interconnected devices, which reproduces the
development complexity of each instruction allowing each device
to have an active operating system instance with the same software
that would be used on the physical device [25].
The COOJA is a flexible Java-based simulator designed to sim-
ulate sensor networks on a platform supported by the ContikiOS
operating system [26]. COOJA can simulate networks with varying
sensor nodes and, as stated by Osterlind et al, [8], a node simulated
by COOJA has three basic properties: a data memory, the node type,
and hardware peripherals. COOJA executes native code through
Java Native Interface (JNI) calls from the virtual machine to the
compiled ContikiOS system.
The COOJA simulator has a data collection tool called Collect
View. It is based on the Java language and aims to capture informa-
tion from nodes as well as to send commands to each node. This
tool assists in obtaining the metrics and data generated regarding
energy consumption, packet delivery time, among other possible
readings by the sensors.
3.4 Threat Model
It is well known that IoT technology has inherited conventional at-
tacks targeting computers on the Internet, and with the emergence
of new protocols, specifically for IoT, the number of possible attacks
has considerably increased. One such attack that has been a major
concern in conventional Internet security and also possible in IoT is
the Distributed Denial of Service attack (DDoS). The DDoS attack
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aims to consume the resources of a host remotely or a network in a
distributed manner, denying or degrading services made available
to legitimate users [14]. The DDoS attack can be of two types: direct
or by reflection.
The reflection attack is the threat model adopted in this paper.
It consists of three steps or components: 1) a server capable of IP
address spoofing, which consists of masking IP packets using MAC
addresses of false senders; 2) a protocol vulnerable to reflection,
that is, a poorly designed UDP-based request protocol; 3) a list of re-
flectors, which are servers that support the protocol’s vulnerability
with the victim’s address. In resume, the victim will end up receiv-
ing a large volume of response packets that it never had requested.
With a large enough attack, the victim may end up with a totally
congested network. The responses delivered to the victim can be
larger than the spoofed requests when used with amplification by
reflection technique. A carefully mounted attack may amplify the
hacker’s traffic.
The idea is based on sending fake UDP requests, spoofing the
source IP address, and placing the victim’s IP address in the source
address field, each packet destined for a random reflector server. The
victim will eventually receive a large volume of response packets
that they never requested. With a sufficiently large attack, the
victim can end up with a congested and unstable network.
Cryptography as a security solution, although it is a technology
prior to the Internet as we know it, and, briefly, it can be described as
a mechanism for data encryption and decryption is a fundamental
ally in supporting and maintaining information security. In this
context, the AES algorithm has a fixed 128-bit block and a key that
can vary between 128, 192, or 256 bits. AES operates on a two-
dimensional array of bytes with a 4x4 position that is called the
state, consisting of four stages, which makes it very difficult due to
its complexity, to be broken encrypted content.
3.5 Intrusion Detection Systems
An Instruction Detection System (IDS) can be defined as an auto-
mated security and defense system that enables the detection of
suspicious and often malicious activity on a network or computer
device. In addition, IDS attempts to prevent such malicious activ-
ities by reporting a different pattern of behavior to the network
administrator.
The intrusion detection process is specifically designed to reten-
tively respond to suspicious activity that may interfere with the
principles of integrity, reliability, and availability [27]. There are
three types of IDS: based in anomaly; based in signature; based in
the host.
3.5.1 Anomaly Detection. This type of IDS seeks to identify un-
usual behaviors within a network, considering these behaviors as
anomalies. This type of IDS assumes that attacks are themselves
different from normal activity and can thus be detected after they
have identified these differences [28].
3.5.2 Signature Detection. Analyze network activity by looking for
events with predefined behavior patterns, previously considering
in a list these behaviors as an attack [27].
3.5.3 Host Based. The IDS resides on the host or IoT device itself
that will be alerted to attacks against the device itself. This type
of IDS is very effective as it provides security for types of attacks
where the firewall and a network-based IDS do not detect [29].
3.6 Proposed IDS
The IDS proposed in this work is of the hybrid type, by anomaly and
host-based. The encryption feature allows identifying behaviors
that are outside the standard considered normal by the security
policy. The proposed IDS workflow is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2: IDS workflow
The evolution of the reflection attack and the moment when the
IDS is executed are summarized in the six steps as follows:
Step 1: a reflection attack will be carried out, to discover the
credentials, which are usually from the factory, or to dis-
cover the common credentials, which are widely used by
inexperienced users and, therefore, have low complexity;
Step 2: after the attack is successful, the attack code will be
sent to the IoT device chosen at random. These devices are
known as reflector nodes;
Step 3: through the botmaster, who is usually the sink, he will
continue to scan the network in an attempt to identify other
victims, always sending reports about his current state and
the other vulnerable devices;
Step 4: the IDS is activated and together its AES algorithm to
improve its security. An encrypted message is sent to alert
that device was compromised;
Step 5: collect the attack information to obtain the energy con-
sumption obtained over the operation;
Step 6: compare the information collected to obtain metrics of
evolution and efficiency in the energy consumption.
4 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND RESULTS
The communication operations between the IoT devices were simu-
lated in the COOJA environment on a Tmote Sky type network. In
this network, each IoT device was represented by a node. Each node
represented a type of sensor with memory and a core of interfaces.
This representation facilitated the work of implementing the intru-
sion detection algorithm, allowing the analysis and study of energy
consumption. The analysis and study were based on customized
scenarios. The low-power network was created in the Contiki op-
erating system, which also offers the possibility of using the RPL
routing protocol.
The first simulation scenario has demonstrated the normal func-
tioning with a limited number of devices to not overload the opera-
tion as shown in Figure 3. Due to the limited processing capacity of
the physical machine, it was observed that less than thirty nodes
would adequately attend the study, without overloading the tests
unnecessarily. During the simulation, raw data were collected in
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isolated operations, in which each was simulated for 37 minutes in
COOJA. The second simulation addressed the attack by reflection.
Finally, the third one allowed the observation of the intrusion de-
tection system in operation during the normal simulation. The IDS
with a normal operation was set to verify the power consumption.
The energy consumption information of the IDS was collected in
a normal operation to prove its efficiency in energy consumption.
The data collected about the energy consumption of the sensors us-
ing the IDS demonstrated that the encryption used didn’t overload
the devices. Therefore, they demonstrated that energy consumption
was slightly higher than when using devices without IDS. The three
scenarios proposed were simulated using all devices configured
as TMote Sky during the entire operation. All information was ex-
tracted using a tool called Powertrace, which is a system call of the
ContikiOS operating system [30].
Figure 3: COOJA Nodes Simulation
4.1 Power consumption of sensors
Based on the analysis of the application layer protocols of IoT
devices, the average energy consumption depends on four levels:
CPU, LPM, TX, and RX [31]. The highest energy consumption
during the simulation was undertaken at the RX level, while the
lowest consumption was observed at the LPM level. Using the
Powertrace, it was possible to monitor the energy flow used in IoT
devices and this tool identified the four levels that contributed to
the energy consumption of the sensor.
The main equation used to obtain the energy consumption is
showed in Equation 1 and was used while the information was
collected by the power system in the ContikiOS operating system.
The initial cycle of sensor energy consumption is represented by
(𝐷) while (𝑦) indicates the type of operation of the IoT device and
finally (𝑁𝑦) represents the number of times the device is in a certain
mode of operation. The watt (W) is the unit of power equivalent to
one joule (J) per second.
𝐷𝑦 =
∑𝑁𝑦
𝑖=1 𝐿𝑦 ∗𝑉𝑦 ∗ Δ𝑡𝑡𝑦
𝐸𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
(1)
After having the energy consumption value used for each vari-
able at Equation 1, another formula was used to calculate the total
energy consumption (in Joule) as shown in Equation 2, as also used
in [32]. This equation considers the current voltage product and
time interval to calculate the energies of each stage: TX, RX, CPU,
and LPM.
4.2 First scenario - Normal
In this scenario, a normal operation was performed between net-
work nodes through message exchange using the UDP protocol.
After the execution, a constant behavior was observed proving nor-
mality during the operation concerning the power used in miliwatts
(mW). The average energy consumption by sensor throughout the
experiment is shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Power energy consumption - normal operation
In the standard error graph, an average standard deviation in the
range of 0.0345 in power consumption (mW) was observed during
the execution of the normal operation without being under attack
and without using the IDS. The observation of behavior occurred
by all nodes. The result obtained can be seen in the graph (Standard
Error - Normal Consumption) available through Figure 5.
The peak power shown at the beginning of the graph, as showed
in Figure 5, represents the initial state of the sensors when they
initiate the message exchange in the COOJA simulator. After all
the sensors exchange information on the network, it is noticed
that there is a decrease in the use of energy until they reach a
normal state. The standard error graph shows this disparity in the
high exchange of messages between sensors during the start of the
simulation.
4.3 Second scenario - under attack
The energy consumption in this simulation was exceedingly high,
which indicates the disturbance suffered by the sensors during the
attack. Figure 6 shows the average energy consumption by sensor
until collapse during the attack and, therefore, there is a high cost
in terms of energy during this type of simulation.
396
XII Computer on the Beach
7 a 9 de Abril de 2021, Online, SC, Brasil Monteiro Luiz et al.
𝐸𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 (𝑚𝐽 ) =
𝑁𝐿𝑃𝑀∑
∀𝑖∈𝐷𝐿𝑃𝑀
𝐼𝐿𝑃𝑀 ∗𝑉𝐿𝑃𝑀 ∗ Δ𝑡𝐿𝑃𝑀𝑖 +
𝑁𝑇𝑥∑
∀𝑗 ∈𝐷𝑇𝑥
𝐼𝑇𝑥 ∗𝑉𝑇𝑥 ∗ Δ𝑡𝑇𝑥 𝑗 +
𝑁𝑅𝑥∑
∀𝑘∈𝐷𝑅𝑥
𝐼𝑅𝑥 ∗𝑉𝑅𝑥 ∗ Δ𝑡𝑅𝑥𝑘 +
𝑁𝐶𝑃𝑈∑
∀𝑧∈𝐷𝐶𝑃𝑈
𝐼𝐶𝑃𝑈 ∗𝑉𝐶𝑃𝑈 ∗ Δ𝑡𝐶𝑃𝑈𝑧
(2)
Figure 5: Standard Error - Normal Consumption
Figure 6: Power energy consumption - under attack
In the standard error graph for the scenario under attack, an
average standard deviation in the range of 0.07461 in power con-
sumption (mW) was observed, without using the IDS. The result
obtained can be seen in Figure 7. It was observed that the distur-
bance of the sensors at 11:50, the time of the COOJA simulator,
compromised the devices, causing, in turn, the complete shutdown
of the sensors. It was noticed, therefore, that after the attack suf-
fered during this time a complete scenario of unavailability was
created.
Figure 7: Standard Error - Attack Consumption
4.4 Third scenario - IDS
The developed IDS uses 128-bit AES encryption to create an au-
thentication between sensors. The use of this IDS during operation
on the network was also simulated for comparison with the two
previous scenarios. The energy consumption obtained during the
execution of a normal scenario using the IDS had a very small
increase as demonstrated in Figure 8. This small increase demon-
strated the efficiency in using the IDS developed using symmetric
key cryptography.
The complexity of the proposed IDS algorithm goes back prac-
tically only to the Network Scan stage since the sending of the
AES message occurs only when an attack appears. The complexity
can be observed in the experiments through the resulting energy
overhead. From Figure 4 to Figure 8, which depict the normal oper-
ation and the operation with IDS, it is noted that the CPU power
consumption moved from 0.05 to 0.1 mW, that is, it doubled. Even
so, this is not critical, as the overhead consumption of the IDS rep-
resented only 25% of the main consumption, that of the antenna in
RX.
Figure 8: Power energy consumption - IDS
The standard error graph showed an average standard deviation
in the range of 0.03846 in power consumption in megawatt during
the execution of the IDS in a normal operation. The result obtained
can be seen in Figure 9.
The attack algorithms were created aimed at low-power sensors
and the creation of an efficient IDS with the ability to detect the
attack by reflection in a low-power IoT network. To establish trust
between the nodes and prevent the attack, a value calculation was
implemented in the IDS to establish a trust relationship between
the nodes in the network. The calculation was performed using
the security algorithm using AES encryption. The purpose of the
calculation was to establish and validate trust relationships between
nodes.
397
XII Computer on the Beach
7 a 9 de Abril de 2021, Online, SC, Brasil Monteiro Luiz et al.
Figure 9: Standard Error - IDS Consumption
Figure 10 shows the average power of the devices (blue line), with
peaks the represent the high power consumption in each attack
suffered. This variation was demonstrated in peaks that represent
the high power consumption in each attack suffered. In turn, the
devices not being able to resist the attack stopped responding. Con-
sequently, the power consumption has been reduced to zero for the
devices due to their spontaneous drop caused by the malfunction.
The sensors were turned off until they were reset. Upon returning
to work, they again suffer an attack that consequently turns them
off. This process enters a repetitive cycle that inevitably causes all
devices on the network to stop working altogether.
In the remaining two lines, represented by the colors orange
and green, their normality is observed during the operation. The
orange line shows the operation of exchanging messages between
IoT devices in a normal scenario, without attacks and also without
any protection. However, on the green line, it can be noted that
it was slightly above the standard, even in the normal scenario.
This increase was due to the presence of the IDS, causing energy
consumption to suffer a small increase. This addition is also due to
the use by the IDS of the AES encryption algorithm. The purpose
of IDS is to notify the network administrator by sending messages
at the moment when the reflection attack is verified. Therefore,
IDS will make it possible to intervene in the availability of devices.
However, human interaction will be necessary to block the attack
or to reestablish services after being notified by IDS. After detecting
the attack, the IDS has a delay of less than a second in its operation
to notify the intrusion.
In the graph of the confidence interval shown in Figure 11, an
average standard error of 0.413 was observed for normal opera-
tion, of 0.301 during the attack and, finally, of 0.512 when using
the intrusion detection system. The simulation in each scenario
was performed eight times, although the proximity of the num-
bers was noted, generating an average from the third simulation.
Interpreting the attack indicator line, it is possible to be 95% sure
that the variation between the lower and upper limits was between
the range of 0.24mW to 0.36mW. This information characterizes
the power loss that the devices had during the execution of the
simulation.
5 CONCLUSIONS
The emergence of IoT has enabled a considerable increase in at-
tacks on telecommunications and information services. With this
increase, information security procedures have emerged through
policies, rules of use, and prevention techniques. These techniques
can be seen as the use of encryption and the use of intrusion detec-
tion systems.
The purpose of using cryptography was to make it possible to
preserve one of the three pillars of information security known in
the literature as availability. To preserve this pillar of information
security, the IDS based on anomaly and host was developed. Due to
its detection character, through unwanted behaviors and installed
in each sensor, an IDS was implemented using the AES algorithm.
To obtain information on energy consumption and the feasibility of
using cryptography as an IDS solution, internal and external COOJA
resources were used with Operational System Contiki support.
Therefore, it was possible to notice that the traffic and energy
consumption presented in the face of a normal operation was com-
patible with reality. The relation to the security protection provided
by the IDS, the consumption was compatible with a low-power
network. As consequence, the target about the total energy con-
sumption that a sensor can consume in a low-power network was
achieved.
Finally, COOJA is a great simulator that allows cost reduction. It
enables the creation of a real scenario, conducive to the research
environment and the study of information security, related to low-
power devices. By elaborating a set of resources for the sensors and
applying them to the COOJA simulator, the solutions can be imple-
mented in a physical and real environment after being exhaustively
tested through the simulator on the logical devices.
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